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ABSTRACT 
EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) have adopted the EU doctrine of 
the Precautionary Principle (PP) in year 2000, whereas the EU is the sole huge region 
where something called the PP is implemented and controlled by case law. There is 
nevertheless a huge contrast between this doctrine and other views put forward by 
stakeholders, specially NGOs, and academic circles. For instance the PP is often confused 
with a Maximin approach or catastrophism, which are shown to be inconstant standards 
under uncertainty. Against this background, the links between the PP and the REACH 
regulation for chemical products are questioned. Beyond common features, it is shown 
that these normative constructs are no substitutes and that the PP should go on to inspire 
public action for chemical substances in conjunction with REACH. 
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The precautionary principle (PP) is a rather new standard of 
behaviour that public authorities may legitimately use –alternatively 
should use – when they face scientific uncertainty about possible damages 
in relation to environmental protection, public health or food safety. It 
developed as a policy and law concept over the last twenty-five years, 
mainly in Europe. A key date to this regard is 1992. First, it has been 
mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty as one of the basic principles 
governing environmental policy of the European Union. Second it has 
been given acknowledgement in the international arena under a watered-
down format deprived of legal strength as a ‘precautionary approach’; it 
so became the Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration adopted in June by the 
Rio Summit. 
Both the principle and the approach are relevant to address collective 
‘potential risks’ or ‘hypothetical hazards or threats’. These expressions 
refer both to hazards, the existence of which is scientifically uncertain, 
being neither proven nor refuted, and to dangers for which, despite their 
known existence, there is no realistic way to establish credible2 
probabilities for the damage scenarios they may entail. The adjective 
‘collective’ means that individual agents are not in a position to control 
these risks (see Box 1) or hazards by themselves, although they may have 
some margins to protect themselves against them. A typical case of 
ascertained collective risks affecting health is influenza. As such 
environmental risks are ‘collective’ by essence: think of dangerous 
alteration of the global climate or the depletion of stratospheric ozone. 
By contrast ‘prevention’ usually addresses known risks for which a 
full risk assessment, leading to quantitative estimates of exposure of 
various groups and estimates of expected damage, can be delivered. As 
such prevention is highly demanding in terms of knowledge and 
information but, being based on rather precise estimates, offers a rational 
basis for policies, for coverage by social security institutions and for the 
business of insurance companies. Scientific uncertainty does not offer the 
same easiness for precautionary action. This is the reason why, before the 
mid-eighties, ill-established hazards, dangers and threats were left to on-
going research and put aside by safety policies. At the same time, scientific 
uncertainty is not easily tackled by the business insurance, so that 
exclusion by insurance companies has during the last decades reinforced 
the interest in precautionary measures aimed at limiting the chance of 
damage to crystallise. 
                                                 
2 For the readers concerned by the objective foundation of probabilities, let us say that the 
latter can only be reached either by logical or theoretical analysis, or by statistical 
observation of repeated events belonging to the same class. 
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In spite of a general agreement that scientific uncertainty delineates 
the field of relevance of the PP, very different competing interpretations of 
what the principle requires as a policy norm have coexisted from the very 
beginnings and still do today. Yet the European Union and member states 
have developed a doctrine and fixed it by year 2000 to specify what the PP 
meant for them and what was rebutted from their understanding. In spite 
of that, there is no other policy concept still raising so many 
misconceptions and misunderstandings than the PP: everybody feels 
legitimate to give the PP a personal content and scrutinize public 
management to denounce failure of governments to implement his or her 
own preferred PP. In spite of their divergence, most people refer to the PP, 
as if one and unique concept of PP was at stake and commonly 
understood. To this regard the biggest contrast can be found between the 
EU PP and a catastrophist approach to uncertain hazards. At the same 
time the logic of compromise at work behind EU statements and rules 
sometimes led the EU governance maintaining ambiguous wording or 
contradictory uses of concepts in relation to the implementation of the PP. 
This will be shown in the context of the REACH regulation addressing 
chemical hazards. 
 
Box 1: troubles with the word risk 
The word ‘risk’ means something different for various people. It has a 
meaning for insurance companies, such as flood risks or car accident 
risks. If risk is defined as “a function of the probability of an adverse 
health effect and the severity of that effect, consequential to a 
hazard”, as in article 3 of EU regulation 78/2002 on food law and food 
safety (European Council, 2002), the expression ‘potential risks’ is not 
consistent, since it designates situations for which it is not possible to 
state an objectively and scientifically established probability. If risk is 
defined by the stochastic nature of the consequences of an action, 
with the stochastic range being expressed around a central value, the 
term ‘potential risks’ is also inappropriate, since it relates exclusively 
to the possibility of harm attributable to exposure to a danger. In fact 
usage and public debate have given a meaning to the word risk 
which is different from the neutral meaning in decision theory. 
Ordinary meaning is ‘danger’, ‘possible damage’ or ‘threat of 
disaster’ with no explicit consideration of probabilities. In this paper I 
will use the word risk in the most extensive meaning, encompassing 
both situations called risks and those called uncertainty by decision 
theory.  
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The first purpose of this paper is to introduce the fundamental 
doctrine of the PP adopted by EU institutions (Commission, Council and 
Parliament) in year 2000 since the EU is the sole huge region where 
something called the PP is implemented and controlled by case law. The 
second is to underline the contrast between this doctrine and other views 
put forward by stakeholders among NGOs, their companion researchers 
and some academic fellows. Then I will turn to chemical products, 
beginning with a question about what the specifics to chemistry may be in 
relation to science and risks. Eventually I will consider the REACH 
regulation and wonder to which extent it may be seen a sensible 
implementation of the PP. 
 
1. Discrepancies between the PP as a policy norm, a concept 
of rational decision theory, and a negotiated political tool 
In the literature there is no agreement on what the specifics in the PP 
really are. On one side non-governmental organizations and their 
academic companions take strong positions on the PP as the main leverage 
to make ruptures with existing risk management and technological 
development modes but at the price of putting ahead often inconsistent or 
unreasonable requirements, as will be seen later. On the other side authors 
grounded in decision theory meet the highest difficulties to catch what the 
PP really brings as a social and legal norm. We then have to tackle several 
types of discrepancy between the following poles: first there is the public 
doctrine, adopted in legal texts and political statements, echoing 
institutional cultures shaped by history; second there is what activist 
NGOs ask for regarding risk management; third there is what 
governments actually do and fourth, there is the academic debate on the 
PP oriented by researches on rational behaviour under uncertainty. 
Figure 1 shows the spread of discrepancies between the four poles 
identified. By order, the most significant are D1, contrasting the public 
doctrine and NGO requirements, D2, between the public doctrine and 
real-life public policies under the pressure –or absence of pressure- of 
social movements and public opinion, D3 between academic framing of 
concepts and the EU public doctrine, D5, between the academic 
recommendations on rational management and requirements of NGOs, 
and D4 between academic framing and real-life management by 
governments. It is clear that the discrepancy game turns differently 
according to the matters involved: GMOs, agricultural chemicals, BSE, 
climate change, nanotechnologies, etc.  
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Figure 1: mapping the discrepancies raised by the Precautionary 
principle 
 
 
Let us give an example of D3. In his recent review articles Charles 
Vlek (2010a and b) places the examination of the PP in the context of 
search of a basic rational attitude for complex, ill-defined, uncertain and 
potentially catastrophic situations. He does not see substantive differences 
in problems for collective decision making and for individuals in their 
everyday lives (financial investment, medical treatment, road transport 
and challenging sports); no attention is either deserved to specific fields of 
concern, such as environmental and public health protection versus profit-
making financial investment: the PP is seen by this author as relevant for 
every practical domain of action and is discussed as a general standard of 
rational decision-making, not as an original policy norm valuable for some 
fields.  
This framing is problematic. It so happens that the dominant 
Bayesian theoretic framework does not admit conceptual distinctions 
between risk and uncertainty. According to Savage’s argument (1954) all 
probabilities are subjective since they imply some confidence level on the 
information given by others (scientists, experts) or directly obtained 
through experience. This way any uncertain situation can be supposedly 
grasped within a subjective probabilistic framing. At the same time, it is 
EU public doctrine:  
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political 
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the decision-theorists’ ambition to deliver relevant analyses of policy-
making touching uncertain risks, as if policy-making were just an exercise 
of applied decision theory. Thus, for the academic viewpoint, the PP has 
difficulty to escape the alternative between either being highly disputable 
or intrinsically flawed, whenever it takes extreme forms of obligation of 
abstention before any potential risk (Sunstein, 2005), or rejoin standard 
criteria developed in probabilistic Bayesian theory. At best the PP is given 
a psychological foundation in particular attitudes of extremely prudent 
agents3 for whom the prospect of getting better knowledge4 in the future 
paradoxically induces an increase of immediate precautionary savings 
compared with a situation of no improvement of knowledge (Gollier, 
Jullien, Treich, 2000).  
At the crossroads of academic literature and more policy-oriented 
reflection Vlek (2010a, p. 533) identifies three distinctive features of the PP: 
the inclination to take a pessimistic view of possible outcomes; the 
proponent’s burden of demonstrating the likelihood of safety of new 
items; a tendency to delay risk-taking until sufficient new information 
becomes available. He concludes:  
 
“the basic motive for being precautious lies in the asymmetric presence of 
possible serious harm or damage vis-à-vis moderate expected benefits” 
(ibid, p. 535).  
 
He then opposes the PP to the Venture principle (VP) involving 
uncertain highly attractive benefits with moderate risks of loss. The 
discussion is interesting, but does not wholly grasp what the PP really is 
for the EU public doctrine. The three features retained by Vlek are in fact 
not constitutive of the EU doctrine of the PP: the latter does not ask either 
to give systematically a premium to the consideration of potential bad 
outcomes or to reverse the burden of proof; the main idea is an early 
account of hypothetical risks, which cannot be confused with a systematic 
delay in risk-taking. 
This case is just an example of a more general feature: unfortunately 
a huge part of academic decision-theoretical literature having the ambition 
to define and discuss the PP misses their target, or exacerbates peripheral 
                                                 
3 Formally the absolute prudence index should be at least twice as high as the index of 
absolute risk aversion (P≥ 2A), knowing that the prudence index is assumed to be 
expressed by the ratio of the third derivative to the second derivative of the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Note that these derivatives are not observable.  
4 This is the way these authors interpret scientific uncertainty: as a promise of better 
knowledge to-morrow than today; and the prospect of better knowledge is supposed to 
increase the uncertainty perceived ex ante by very prudent people. 
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aspects of the PP. This is not to say that they absolutely lack of relevance 
since they may bring fine arguments against such and such practice of the 
PP by the authorities or against such and such demand of business circles 
or NGOs. 
The PP brings novelty in risk management but novelty does not lie in 
the fact that the PP would express a systematically more precautious 
attitude, in the ordinary sense, than previous prevention policies for every 
aspect, for instance by increasing safety margins, focusing on worst-case, 
or letting decision absorbed by strong aversion to risk. The practical 
novelty of the PP is to put ill-known and uncertain hazards identified in 
the field of environmental protection and public health into the domain of 
public attention and action, especially in cases of threats of huge and 
irreversible damage.  
It first implies a social value choice, considering that environmental 
protection and human health take precedence over economic profitability 
when conflicts arise. Secondly it rehabilitates the old (Knight, 1921; 
Keynes, 1921) distinction between uncertainty and risk, i.e. between 
hypothetical hazards stricken by uncertainty, which are not amenable to 
probabilistic calculations, and recognised risks amenable to probabilistic 
calculations and fitting to the standard concept of prevention. By essence, 
this distinction between prevention and precaution cannot be understood 
by Bayesian and Savage’s approaches of risk5.  
This breakthrough being made, the foremost ingredient of the PP is 
to ask for an early account of possible hazards in spite of scientific 
uncertainty: authorities should not wait for full scientific certainty and 
should not use uncertainty as a pretext to postpone measures addressing 
possible hazards. Thus the main innovation of the PP is to change the time 
schedule of policies in relation to risks in favour of an early account 
(Godard, 1997; European Environmental Agency, 2001). At the same time, 
informed ignorance, i.e. ignorance that remains after having mobilised 
existing sources of scientific information- or the simple postulated 
presupposition that “bad effects could happen” are not sufficient to 
mobilize the PP. This principle is concerned by the cognitive grey zone 
existing between ignorance about possible risks and well-known risks. 
 
                                                 
5 Economic approaches developed within a Bayesian framework are presented in Kast 
and Lapied (2004) and Gollier (2004). 
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2. The conceptual context 
Scientific uncertainty 
Scientific uncertainty delineates the background to the PP. 
Ascertaining what scientific uncertainty really is raises difficulties of their 
own for risk managers. It should be confused neither with the when and 
where uncertainty of contingent events of day-to-day life, such as “when 
will the next flood touch New Orleans?”, nor with rough ignorance. 
Scientific uncertainty is not to be confused with a complete lack of 
information about possible outcomes of a technology but should be seen 
as a lack of conclusive scientific knowledge about laws, processes, 
mechanisms, or properties of specific natural phenomena, such as changes 
of behaviours of substances when they are organized at nanoscale or 
detrimental processes induced by non-conventional pathogens. Scientific 
uncertainty is not when you know nothing, but when what you know is 
not conclusive and remains at the stage of unresolved hypotheses and 
conjectures, although the latter have been formulated in accordance with 
standard scientific approaches and empirical observations. 
With this background, scientific uncertainty may affect different 
points of risky situations. We may have uncertainty in the realization of 
harm: harm is then just a possibility which has been neither dismissed nor 
proven. We may also have uncertainty in the causes of a given 
phenomenon: damage to health or a detrimental process affecting the 
environment is observed, but we do not know for sure which causes it 
should be imputed to. Both types of uncertainty are derived from 
insufficient knowledge on the relationship between active causes (a 
technology, a substance…) and detrimental effects. 
Scientific uncertainty constitutes a challenge not only for experts and 
managers, but also for the legitimacy of public action: welfare state and 
public action in Europe have been developed on the basis of a rational-
legal model for which establishing objectivity of issues is a critical feature 
for enabling decision-makers to act according to the general interest and 
obtain confidence and support from public opinion. When facing 
uncertainty, individual agents may shape beliefs about probabilities of ill-
defined events –a catastrophe?-, from a mixture of piecemeal information 
and personal attitudes and values. It may lead to the formation of 
subjective opinions regarding riskiness of situations. These psychological 
constructs are nonetheless deprived of direct relevance as a basis for 
reasonable public action, except by setting ultimate political limits of 
social acceptability under a democratic regime in contexts marked by high 
stakes and strong social controversies. 
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Indeed policy-making in democracies entails another requirement, 
that of justifying goals and actions before citizens with the help of 
diagnoses and arguments which can be shared with most of citizens. A 
symmetrical obligation to ascertain positions and proposals is addressed 
to the citizens who make various demands. So both governments and 
citizens have to justify actions and policies they propose, whereas 
respective arguments are open to discussion. In that context scientific 
expertise aims at reaching shared statements which approach objectivity 
and enlighten decision-making. At stake, the definition of a common 
world on the basis of which public deliberation may take a reasonable 
form beyond unavoidable trade-off between interests and between 
concerns.  
Under scientific uncertainty the possibility of citizens to share an 
objectively determined common world is put in peril and public 
deliberation becomes difficult, controversial and inconclusive, unless there 
is an agreement throughout society on how to address hypothetical risks. 
This critical link between public decision making and objectivity explains 
the huge role of scientific expertise in public decision making in relation to 
risks for the environment and health. Unfortunately it is generally ignored 
by academic work belonging to decision theory due to its individualistic 
and subjective approach. For its advocates public decision-making only 
comes to finding appropriate procedures for aggregating consumers’ 
individual preferences or defining how a public decision-maker can 
manage various sources of information and influences in order to 
maximize her own utility function (power, career, wealth, honours…). 
Since under scientific uncertainty objective probabilistic formulations 
are not at hand, supplementary points of support have to be found to 
make reasonable decisions: this need sets the legitimacy of more extended 
procedures of public debate and dialogue with interested parties in 
parallel to scientific expertise and normative assessments produced by 
lawyers, economists and ethicists. With this three-ways approach, the PP 
clearly calls on a case by case reflection to elicit judgments on 
proportionate and provisional measures targeting potential dangers or 
uncertain threats. 
 
The PP as a principle 
Principles are beings different from rules and criteria (Godard, 2010): 
various principles may coexist in spite of contradictory implications; they 
do not establish a complete order on a set of actions; they are compatible 
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with different criteria6 –but not all-. For instance in spite of what is often 
said (Gardiner, 2006), the PP does not identify with a Maximin criterion. 
So the question is raised: why are principles useful? Their purpose is to 
provide a broad base for more precise rules and criteria valuable for 
particular circumstances; in doing so, they articulate agreed social values 
and legitimate forms of commitment into action in rather abstracts terms. 
They establish a meaning that gives directions and clarifies existing or 
proposed institutional procedures. They are a reference point in a 
coordination process that must accommodate numerous transformations 
and wide empirical diversity. Eventually, they stimulate change in an 
existing normative system (de Sadeleer, 2003). Many criticisms addressed 
to the PP –being vague, unclear and not operational- in fact fault it for 
being a principle, and not a criterion, which is just nonsense. 
 
A conceptual heritage 
Explicit formulation of a PP goes back to the German Vorsorgeprinzip 
in the 1970s. It then combined two main ideas: a) not waiting for the stage 
of scientific certainty on causal relationships involved before undertaking 
preventive action designed to limit or avoid environmental threats; b) 
committing to a long-term, continuous and adaptive approach to 
environmental measures, by being opportunistic in the use of 
technological progress to drive ecological modernization of industrial 
processes. 
These two ideas have been somewhat separated by the following 
history. The second joined the stream of sustainable development, while 
the first emerged as the PP. Meanwhile both remain compatible and even 
complementary. As the 2000 Nice Resolution on the PP (see below) states, 
the PP has to be understood under the light of sustainable development. 
In France the 1995 law 95-101 for the strengthening of environmental 
protection defined the PP in the following terms:  
 
“Absence of certainty, taking account of current scientific and technical 
knowledge, should not lead to postpone the adoption of effective and 
proportionate measures aimed at averting the risk of serious and irreversible 
damage to the environment, at an economically acceptable cost”. 
 
In May 1998, the European Court of Justice produced a judgment in 
relation to the mad cow disease case between the UK government and the 
Commission; it then confirmed the PP in substance by reckoning that the 
                                                 
6 See Vlek (2010b) for a review of possible decision-making criteria to be used for the 
implementation of the PP. 
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authorities were justified in taking health measures without waiting to 
have full scientific certainty about causal links and the extent of damage. 
For the first time this decision gave the PP an autonomous legal force in an 
area other than that of the environment: food and health safety (European 
Court of Justice, 1998; Gonzalez Vaqué et al., 1999). 
Following a request from the European Council and an open 
consultation process with stakeholders, the Commission released a 
communication on the PP in February 2000. This key text expounded the 
doctrine which would inspire the Commission’s policy in the field of 
environmental risks (European Commission, 2000). It places the PP in the 
context of risk analysis according to agreed international standards, in 
spite of the fact that risk assessment cannot be conclusive. Concepts of 
proportionality, coherence and regular revision of measures are stressed, 
as well as the need for public authorities to organize an independent, 
competent, multi-disciplinary, transparent and adversarial expertise. On 
this basis, a “Resolution on the precautionary principle” was adopted by 
European heads of state and governments at the Nice summit in 
December 2000 (European Council, 2000), soon followed by a symmetrical 
statement of the EU Parliament. These convergent documents gave a 
political legitimacy to a specific, ‘proportionate’ doctrine of the PP 
confirming the main ideas already kept by the Rio Statement and the 
French law. 
In 2002, the European regulation 178/2002 on food safety was 
adopted. It poses a principle in Article 14:  
 
“Food shall not be placed on the market if it is unsafe. Food shall be deemed 
to be unsafe if it is considered to be (a) injurious to health; (b) unfit for 
human consumption”.  
 
This requirement of safety should be assessed by taking account of normal 
conditions of use and information given to consumers. It also made the PP 
one of the pillars of food safety regulation. Article 7 says under the title 
‘Precautionary principle’:  
 
“1. In specific circumstances where, following an assessment of available 
information, the possibility of harmful effects on health is identified but 
scientific uncertainty persists, provisional risk management measures 
necessary to ensure the high level of health protection chosen in the 
Community may be adopted, pending further scientific information for a 
more comprehensive risk assessment. 
2. Measures adopted on the basis of paragraph 1 shall be proportionate and 
no more restrictive of trade than is required to achieve the high level of 
health protection chosen in the Community, regard being had to technical 
and economic feasibility and other factors regarded as legitimate in the 
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matter under consideration. The measures shall be reviewed within a 
reasonable period of time, depending on the nature of the risk to life or 
health identified and the type of scientific information needed to clarify the 
scientific uncertainty and to conduct a more comprehensive risk 
assessment”.  
 
From this have been drawn specific action and informational obligations 
for the agrifood business: whenever an operator has suspicion on the 
safety of food ingredients he bought or of processes or of food products he 
has put on the market, he has obligations to withdraw the products and 
inform competent authorities and affected consumers, if it happened that 
products were already in their hands (European Council, 2002). On the 
intellectual ground, this regulation already suffered from the inner tension 
that REACH will most importantly share between the requirement of 
safety and the state of scientific uncertainty: what is safety in uncertain 
contexts? How can safety be ascertained under scientific uncertainty?  
In March 2005, the French Congress added an Environmental 
Charter to the French Constitution, giving a constitutional value to the 
goal of environmental protection and stating that public policies must aim 
at sustainable development. It refers in Article 5 to the obligations of the 
public authorities in implementing the PP:  
 
“If the occurrence of damage has the potential to affect the environment in a 
serious and irreversible manner, even though there may be scientific 
uncertainty, the public authorities should make sure, by applying the 
precautionary principle and within the limits of their attributions, that risk 
assessment procedures are followed and that provisional and proportionate 
measures are taken in order to ward off the damage”7.  
 
This article emphasizes the eminent responsibility of public authorities in 
organizing the implementation of the PP as well for putting in place 
appropriate evaluation of risks and for taking appropriate measures 
which would be proportionate and provisional. 
Following a Chemicals White Paper issued by the EU Commission in 
2001 (Rogers, 2003), the REACH regulation entered into force in spring 
2007. This regulation targets chemical substances not already covered by 
existing regulations. As said by the acronym this regulation introduces 
new obligations and procedures aiming at registering, evaluating and 
authorizing –or forbidding- chemical substances by tens of thousands, 
since both existing and new chemicals are concerned. Special attention is 
given to chemicals classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic or reprotoxic 
                                                 
7 Unofficial translation from French. 
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(CMR), or as persistent organic pollutants (POP). Whereas previously 
chemicals could only be banned if proven to be dangerous, REACH 
requires EU industry and importers to prove that each substance intended 
for the market is safe for human health and the environment. This is what 
is sometimes referred to as reversal of the burden of proof. This strong 
formula of ‘reversal’ is about a lie to the extent that it omits the fact that is 
not possible to prove the absence of future damage with an incomplete, 
ongoing science; the proof will be limited to existing tests and stabilized 
knowledge, without any possibility to dismiss future scientific progress 
and discoveries on new types of harm. Here is revealed the inherent 
contradiction of the wording of REACH, which can only be overcome by 
adding subtle conditions and provisions in the evaluation-authorization 
process.  
 
3. The precautionary principle in the EU doctrine 
Two main texts express the PP doctrine of the EU: the 
Communication presented by the Commission in February 2000 and the 
Resolution adopted by European heads of state at the Nice Summit in 
December 2000. These texts have no direct legal force, but delineate a 
politically legitimated conception which should inspire action by the 
Commission and across all member states. It should also inspire legal 
decisions by jurisdictions and in particular the European Court of Justice8. 
This doctrine is summarized in Box 29. 
As is synthesised by Rogers (2011), the EU PP adopts five 
components for screening precautionary actions: 
 
• Proportionality to the chosen level of protection. 
• Non-discrimination, in particular in regard to imported products. 
• Consistency with similar measures previously taken for known 
risks, but taking account of scientific progress and change of 
concerns in the society. 
• Choice of measures based on the consideration of the potential 
benefits and costs or various possible actions, including the no-
action option. 
• Periodic review of measures in the light of new scientific results. 
 
                                                 
8 To this regard, see Stokes (2008) and Rogers (2011). 
9 See also Klinke et al., (2006). 
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Box 2: The EU doctrine on the precautionary principle 
1. The PP is to be applied if the scientific information is inconclusive 
and there are reasonable grounds for concern that potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant 
health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection. 
The possibility of harmful effects on health or the environment 
has to be identified through procedures scientifically recognized 
but the preliminary scientific assessment of available facts and 
scientific results does not enable to determine the risk with 
sufficient certainty.  
2. The PP is to be understood and implemented within a sustainable 
development perspective. 
3. To proceed to an assessment of the risks, the public authority 
should have an appropriate research framework, drawing in 
particular on scientific committees and relevant scientific work; 
public authorities are responsible for organizing risk assessment, 
which should be conducted independently and transparently on a 
multidisciplinary basis; open debate and adversarial procedures 
should be enhanced. The assessment of the risk should allow the 
mention of minority views in public reports. 
4. Civil society should be implicated and particular attention should 
be paid to consulting all interested parties at the earliest possible 
stage. 
5. The whole spectrum of measures able to achieve the desired 
protection level should be considered, including the no-action 
option. The choice of measures should respect the principle of 
proportionality by taking into account short and long-term risks 
and by aiming at the high level of protection sought; the least 
restrictive measures for trade should be sought under the 
condition that they reach the searched level of protection. 
Measures should be consistent with those already taken in similar 
situations, taking account of the most recent scientific 
developments and the evolving level of protection sought. 
6. Measures taken on the basis of the PP should be re-examined in 
the light of the development of scientific knowledge. To this end, 
follow-up of the effects of decisions should be implemented and 
further research carried out to reduce the level of uncertainty. 
 
Application field and first order responsibility  
The relevant field of legal application of the PP is limited to the 
environment, health of animals and plants, human health, food and feed. 
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The PP applies both to the Commission’s policies and actions and to those 
of the member states. Public authorities stand at the forefront to organize 
the appropriate implementation of the PP: they are responsible for 
setting-up scientific assessments and launching dedicated research 
actions in order to elucidate pending scientific uncertainty. They bear the 
political responsibility of estimating the right level of acceptable risk 
though they should remain in line with the EU objective to ensure a high 
level of protection of health and the environment, and with principles of 
proportionality and consistency with the measures adopted for other 
similar situations and with international trade law, with a special mention 
to the Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) and on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (Belvèze, 2003). 
 
Proportionality 
Proportionality is an important ingredient of the EU doctrine. This 
word is a clear affirmation that the PP does not embrace catastrophism 
(see later) as the relevant framing to address hypothetical risks. The PP 
takes part to a risk management aiming at a high level of environmental 
and health safety, but its purpose is not to condemn any risk or to 
guarantee that no damage would ever happen. Moreover, the objective is 
not to minimize possible damage at any cost. In other words, the PP is a 
way to organize safe conditions for the development of technologies, not 
a means to block technological development. At the same time 
seriousness of envisaged damage may lead to renounce to specific 
technologies or specific uses, especially when less threatening alternatives 
are available at a moderate cost. 
For EU law, built in favour the free circulation of goods, 
proportionality includes three key requirements (Gonzales-Vaqué et al., 
1999): 
• the measure should be appropriate to its objective (notion of 
efficacy); 
• the measure should be necessary in the sense that that there are no 
other measures which are equally effective and less restrictive for 
international trade; 
• there should be a reasonable link between the objective sought and 
the constraints imposed on the circulation of goods. 
Within national contexts of member states, other dimensions of 
proportionality are relevant. All costs and benefits possibly involved, 
including those having a moral standing (basic liberties versus safety, for 
instance) have to be examined for each measure and balanced with the 
possible seriousness of the damage. To this regard due attention should 
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be given to the extent and richness of the scientific basis supporting 
hypotheses of risks, in order to assess scientific plausibility in absence of 
reliable probabilities (Godard, 2003). 
 
Burden of proof 
Whatever may have been said (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1998; 
Hansen et al., 2007), the idea of shifting the burden of proof does not 
belong to the core EU doctrine of the PP. It is an option depending on 
situations. For example, for food additives, new foods, or drugs, the PP 
should be just incorporated into existing procedures of administrative 
authorization prior to being put on the market, without altering the pre-
existing rule. For products and processes already on the market and 
widely used, responsibility of bringing the expected scientific evidence 
supporting suspicion of harm is placed on the shoulder of third parties or 
the public authorities who suspect possible inacceptable harm. 
In fact, in the context of the PP, the idea of reversing the burden of 
proof is quite ambiguous and conceals a real shift regarding what is to be 
proven. Strictly speaking, shifting the burden of proof and asking to prove 
absolute safety represent a logical impossibility. The scientific proof of the 
harmlessness of a product, substance or technique definitely cannot be 
brought when the scientific knowledge involved is neither complete nor 
fixed and incorporates uncertainty. Numerous authors have emphasized 
this impossibility. Some sources of uncertainty may be reduced with 
research, experience and time; others reflect intrinsic incompleteness of 
knowledge. Hence, the movement launched by the PP asking for an early 
account of risks does not consist in shifting the burden of proof but in 
moving public management of risks away from the concept of scientific 
proof and keeping the latter at bay, whatever should be proven, damage 
or safety. Naturally, this does not mean that public management should 
ignore scientific knowledge. The contrary is true: the PP asks risk 
management to be more attentive to science in development and to what 
constitutes the ordinary course of research (conjectures, hypotheses, 
ambiguous results, etc.). 
When they keep themselves in line with honesty, authors who speak 
of the reversal of the burden of proof are in fact not aiming at proof of the 
absence of risk, but at setting up authorization procedures implying for 
proponents to present results of studies establishing the safety of their 
products or technologies by using standard tests based on existing 
knowledge. Such tests cannot dismiss the possibility of future harm in 
relation to still unknown paths. When activists ask for the proof of absence 
of risk, with the time horizon being extended to long term effects, it is 
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quite another thing. Asking for what scientists cannot deliver, they slide 
into mere political rhetoric and use the argument of reversal of proof as a 
means to obtain endless moratoriums against targeted products and 
technologies.  
Moreover, assigning to the proponents the responsibility of 
developing studies and safety tests of the products and technologies they 
want to put on the market is not the best means to ensure the credibility 
and transparency of scientific expertise on risks (Godard, 2005), even if 
they are competent and honest. Expertise of risks is expected to be 
independent and to be carried out according to precise multidisciplinary 
rules, transparency and the principles of adversarial examination and 
open debate. This cannot be easily done by private business and it anyway 
meets scepticism of public opinion when expertise and information come 
from business. How to ensure that information transmitted to public 
expert committees is not incomplete and truncated? 
All this would argue in favour of a separation between the financial 
burden of studies and the assignment of operational responsibility of 
scientific tests. The latter should be imputed to independent scientific 
applied research and tests placed under public and open supervision, 
which is not the case in the present state of EU regulation. The quality of 
the review process by public agencies is no substitute for the quality and 
credibility of primary studies on which public agencies depend. 
 
Searching for consistency, an extension of a comparative approach 
The rationale of the PP is not justifying extreme and extravagant 
measures that would paradoxically be much more demanding and 
restrictive than those taken for well-documented and evaluated risks. 
Asking for policy consistency implies to extend the perimeter of 
assessment to similar cases and thus to comparative approaches. Profiles 
of several similar risks, some of them being potential and others 
ascertained, should be compared. An analogous extension will result from 
the consideration of possible precaution actions, which possibly includes 
less hazardous alternatives: due to limitations of knowledge and data on 
possible end-results of introducing new technologies or new products, 
attention may shift towards the search of substitutes having a priori lower 
impacts. To this regard some authors propose to substitute a focus on risks 
(endpoints) by one on intrinsic features of hazards, from risk assessment 
to hazard assessment. For instance Müller-Herold and al. (2005) suggest to 
systematically considering the existence of amplifying factors able to 
transform local damages into large-scale ones, and to use them as filters in 
an authorization process. According to these views, the PP does not only 
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ask for considering a whole spectrum of candidate actions to control a 
given threat of damage, but also to explore the existence of alternatives to 
the use of suspected technology or products and so avoid risk-risk 
tradeoffs (Hansen et al., 2007). 
 
Taking risks to improve knowledge and reduce uncertainty  
Far from catastrophism, the PP should be able to accept activities 
suspected of creating health or environmental risks, even when such risks 
are poorly understood, but with progressive commitment and a special 
side-programme of observation in order to identify first signs of emerging 
damage and to learn about the presumed risks. This is one of the 
paradoxes created by the PP: it may be necessary to take risks in order to 
check the very existence of those risks and get knowledge on them10. This 
commitment is linked to the key conceptual component of the PP which 
refuses any complacent acceptance of initial scientific uncertainty: the PP 
should not be the ultimate rationale of risk management but the one which 
organizes the transition to a state of better knowledge of risks, allowing to 
go from precaution to prevention. The early consideration of risk 
hypotheses should be supplemented by specific programs aiming at 
reducing and possibly eliminating this uncertainty. In that, the PP is 
different from the sort of instrumentalisation of scientific uncertainty in 
the service of the interests of stakeholders who use debate on the 
management of potential risks to improve their social positions or power. 
 
4. The dead-end of catastrophism 
The PP asks for an early account of potential or hypothetical threats 
in spite of remaining scientific uncertainty. It also asks for proportionate 
and provisional measures. Is well thought-out precaution possible if done 
early? Are we not faced by a basic contradiction between the obligation to 
act early and the search for a cost-efficient action? If we want to prevent 
that hypothetical risks become real damage, are we not obliged to take 
measures based on worst case scenario, which would make no difference 
between known risks and potential risks, between prevention and 
                                                 
10 Decision theory confronted with irreversibility has shown the existence of three types 
of irreversibility: those affecting the set of possible actions, those concerning the real 
consequences on the environment or human health; those affecting future knowledge 
and information. There are actions which bring new information and actions which 
forbid gaining new insights on possible risks. If expected knowledge and information are 
very important, the best choice may be to commit to the potentially risky action that will 
bring them. 
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precaution? All these questions turn around the same issue: to control 
hypothetical risks, is it not necessary to embrace a catastrophist framing?  
In its full conceptual development, catastrophism can be 
characterized by the combination of three ideas (Godard, 2006): (1) 
tackling an uncertain context by focusing on the worst case scenario; (2) 
deciding, by convention, to consider this scenario as certain if no action is 
undertaken; (3) choosing the forms and intensity of preventive action 
necessary to block the realisation of this scenario.  
There are several types of catastrophism, from the most respectable 
philosophical work of Hans Jonas (1984) to confused, vulgar and 
inadvertent ones. None of them can be defended since all of them are 
stricken by theoretical inconsistency or non-sense. 
 
Catastrophism and Hans Jonas’s Responsibility Principle 
The point of departure of Hans Jonas’s thinking is the huge threat 
that the power of modern technology poses for the future existence of 
humanity. Hence the idea of a new responsibility for the future. Jonas also 
bears a specific view of technology: technology is only controllable in its 
beginnings and first steps of development and diffusion; subsequently 
technology spreads through society and becomes an autonomous, 
unmanageable force. Action to control technology at its beginnings is the 
only possibility to safeguard the future of humanity from anticipated 
catastrophes. In order to be well-adjusted, control of technological impacts 
should be based on scientific forecasting11 but also on imagination and 
sensibility applied to possible future consequences of technology. This is 
what Jonas calls ‘heuristics of fear’. What is important for him is to 
distinguish technologies that may have direct and indirect apocalyptic 
impacts on the existence of humanity from the other ones. Avoiding 
apocalyptic risks is, to Jonas’ view, the sole and unique moral categorical 
imperative: such risks must be eliminated, whatever the probabilities 
involved and whatever the expected benefits of the technological 
development under scrutiny. To this regard, reversing the Cartesian 
position12, the mere possibility of an apocalyptic risk should be considered 
                                                 
11 Jonas underlines the new moral status given to what he calls ‘futurology’, a future-
oriented science dedicated to the identification and assessment of possible effects of 
technological developments in relation to the environment and human essence. 
12 Jonas wrote: "To establish the indubitable truth, we must, according to Descartes, hold 
everything that in one way or another may be put into doubt as equivalent to a proven 
falsehood. Here, on the contrary, we must treat that which can certainly be put into 
doubt, as long as it is possible - once we're dealing with a possibility of a certain kind - as 
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as a certainty at the moment of profiling prevention measures intended to 
eradicate this type of risks. For non-apocalyptic risks, ordinary risk 
management considering costs and benefits of technology is acceptable, 
which would admit the possibility for some damage to become reality: 
individuals have the right to put their own existence at risk, not the right 
to put the existence of humanity at risk. According to the heuristics of fear, 
if a technology incorporates a chance of causing apocalyptic harm, even 
indirectly or far in the future, it should be refused and banned.  
The value of the new maxim depends on the capacity of risk 
managers to ascertain at an early stage which technologies are potentially 
apocalyptic and which ones are not. If the possibility of apocalyptic 
outcomes cannot be dismissed on the basis of scientific investigations, it 
should be categorized as ‘certainly apocalyptic’ according to Jonas. This 
position is flawed and reveals inner contradictions in the thought of Jonas. 
The structural incapacity of scientific knowledge to embrace the spread of 
technology’s effects, on which Jonas bases the argument in favour to his 
“heuristics of fear”, means that the possibility of an apocalyptic outcome 
can never be ruled out. Since Jonas excludes any reference to the idea of 
probability, all technological developments should be said potentially 
apocalyptic, whatever the plausibility involved in that qualification 
(Godard et al., 2002; Godard, 2003). And any technological development 
should be banned at their outset because of their risks.  
Against his formal distinction between apocalyptic and ordinary 
risks, the Jonas’s maxim would entail a paralysis of human action. Even if 
we can accept many of his premises, the model of action he puts forward 
leads to a logical and practical dead-end. Furthermore, this radical 
conception would give rise to a false sense of security, since paralysis of 
innovation would maintain humanity in dependence of existing 
technologies, whereas many of them were at the source of the present 
environmental crisis. The PP should definitely put aside the “guilty if not 
proven innocent” position inspired by Jonas since innocence cannot be 
proven. 
 
The vulgar catastrophism 
There is no much to say about the vulgar catastrophism, which is just 
an extension of Jonas’ maxim to all possible threats to the environment 
and human health, which Jonas considered as highly irrational. The aim of 
the PP cannot be to eradicate at source any possible risk. It still remains a 
                                                                                                                                     
a certainty with respect to our decisions”. Here the ‘possibility of a certain kind’ referred 
to an apocalyptic outcome. 
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meta-decision of choosing which potential risks can be taken and 
accompanied by proportional and provisional measures regularly revised 
in view of experience and progress of knowledge, and which potential 
risks should not be taken. Such meta-decision cannot be taken by using 
the general slogan of reversed proof of safety.  
A weak form of vulgar catastrophism is to ask for a policy choice 
minimizing the possible damage across several technological options, with 
no consideration given to costs and scientific plausibility. After John 
Rawls and for a different matter, Gardiner (2006) defended this Maximin 
rule in specific contexts where potential gains are negligible and 
alternative courses of action are unacceptable. These are very particular 
conditions and certainly not a general model of situations of potential risk 
management. Furthermore the value of this rule evanishes in contexts 
where all possible outcomes have not been identified and it is impossible 
to define a closed set of outcomes. In the latter case, the game space is not 
bounded and the logic of Maximin cannot be deployed. It will get stuck on 
indecision because of a race to the bottom and levelling of all options by 
the worst: what should you do, if apocalypse is the possible end-result of 
each alternative? 
 
The involuntary catastrophism: the earliness-seriousness artefact 
There is a certain type of risk assessment, apparently supported by 
ethics or common sense goodwill, which triggers an involuntary 
catastrophism. It is so because of a pure artefact resulting from an inverse 
relation between the earliness in considering hypothetical risks and their 
image of seriousness (Godard, 2003, 2006): the initial justification of the PP 
is that because of seriousness and irreversibility of possible damage 
resulting from suspected risks, early preventative action should be taken. 
The inversed relation would be that because of earliness of consideration, 
any risk comes to being suspected of potentially having apocalyptic 
consequences, then deserving the strongest prevention measures. This 
artefact may impose itself whatever the risk of concern. The underpinning 
logic is the following: the more a risk is considered early on regarding the 
level of scientific achievement, the greater the number of hypothesises and 
conjectures that are not yet proven to be wrong, the more the set of 
possible scenarios will include catastrophic outcomes and the greater the 
envisaged technology will be perceived as dangerous, and the more this 
risk will call for severe and restrictive measures. One then ends up with 
the same aporetic result as with Jonas’s maxim. 
The biased assessment procedure giving rise to these unexpected 
aporetic effects rests on two statements chosen as ‘axioms’ which look 
O. Godard – The precautionary principle and chemical risks  -22- 
 22
attractive and sound at first sight. The first requires that the public 
appraisal of a collective risk only considers possible damages, without 
giving a look at possible benefits for society. The underlying rationale is 
that the principle of basic freedom acknowledged to entrepreneurs assigns 
them the role of appraising the benefits of their projects or technical 
innovations; public responsibility is thus limited to making sure that these 
initiatives do not generate unacceptable damage for the society13. The 
second axiom basically takes up Jonas’s position, in requiring, in the name 
of the future, that a non-invalidated possibility be treated as a certainty. By 
combining these two axioms is sufficient to trigger the earliness-
seriousness artefact. 
To find a way-out of this deleterious artefact it is necessary to reverse 
the content of the two axioms. First, risk assessment should also take into 
account the various social benefits of technical developments, without 
confining itself to potential damage. Next, it is essential to differentiate 
risk hypotheses according to their degree of plausibility and scientific 
consistency: a hypothesis still lacking of any empirical and theoretical 
support should not be treated the same way as a hypothesis strongly 
supported by scientific inputs but still not established according to the 
views of a majority of competent scientists. 
 
5. The specifics with chemical risks 
Chemistry is an ‘impure science’, since it intrinsically mixes the quest 
for knowledge with technological applications. As Bensaude & Simon 
(2008) put it: 
 
“chemistry serves as the archetypal techno-science, unable to restrict itself to 
the high-ground of pure theory, but always engaged in productive practice”.  
 
The industrial production of chemicals has been a major new source 
of environmental disruption since WWII, allowing for industrializing 
agricultural production with intensive use of energy and chemical inputs 
but also for a mass usage of plastic products and packaging (Milton & 
Farvar, 1972). Residues of pesticides have come to the forefront as a huge 
threat for human health through the contamination of food and we find 
traces of industrial chemicals in every sample of water in the world. The 
                                                 
13 This principle does not apply in the area of drugs and medical products, where on the 
contrary risk-benefit analysis has been adopted by medical circles as the right assessment 
framework. But in that case, as well benefits as risks of damage are related to health 
impacts and do not directly embrace considerations of commercial benefits of drugs 
companies. 
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pervasive diffusion of chemicals is all the more striking that most of 
substances have not been duly tested for their environmental and health 
impacts beyond light toxicity tests. The unknown is not only a feature of 
new molecules recently invented by chemistry; it is the most common 
feature of chemicals that have been disseminated for several decades in 
the atmosphere, in waters and in soils. Threat is already there and we did 
not know much about it. For these threats, we are very far from an early 
account of risks. 
Another feature of chemistry, as a science, is that it produces new 
substances and not only knowledge on the existing material world. New 
substances introduce new properties difficult to anticipate and difficult to 
catch in all their possible consequences. So the development of chemistry 
is a permanent source of new unknowns. With biochemistry, the new 
challenge is nowadays to reach synthetic life. The heritage of the 
alchemical tradition is still there. As said by Schummer (2001), 
 
“With every production of a new substance, the scope of nonknowledge 
increases tremendously, by the number of undetermined properties of the 
new substance as well as by all chemical reactivities of the already existing 
substances with the new one.” 
 
Due to the mass number of new chemical substances introduced in 
ecosystems, this creative process entails an increasing unpredictability of 
environmental changes. Creating a new substance and putting it on the 
market come to generating new unpredictable potentials of harm to the 
environment and public health, increasing difficulties of a prior control of 
these harms. This is a legitimate source of concern: chemistry is a major 
cause which renders our world unpredictable. There is not better 
justification for submitting the products of chemistry’s innovation to 
rigorous procedures of public control and to place those procedures under 
the flag of the PP. 
 
6. REACH and chemicals 
An outline 
Following a 2001 White paper, the European regulation REACH 
(Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals) came into force 
on 1 June 2007. It was the outcome of a six-year chaotic deliberation 
process animated by markedly opposite positions putting on balance 
public health, environmental quality and industrial competitiveness. 
Elizabeth Fisher (2008) sees in that process a ‘perfect storm’ due to the 
convergence of three components: a radically innovative approach 
regarding new information duties of business both in bearing the burden 
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of safety studies and in disseminating information to all stakeholders 
alongside the supply chain; the rewriting of the conditions of access to the 
market by making registration an absolute condition to obtain a ‘licence to 
operate’ in order to achieve sustainable development; the spread of 
impacts on multiple jurisdictions within and outside the EU. 
This regulation echoed several concerns in relation to, respectively, 
the health and environmental impacts of toxic substances, the lack of 
knowledge about effects of most chemicals having been put on the market 
and disseminated into physical environments, the incapability of 
governments to inform and run a timely control of thousands of chemical 
substances and last but not least, the lack of incentives for safer and 
greener chemicals due to the previous regulation’s focus on new 
substances from 1981. 
The REACH regulation consists of three main components:  
1. Registration of all chemicals (substances and products) intended to the 
market, be they ‘new’ or ‘old’, provided that their level of production 
exceeds 1 tonne/year/producer. The procedure asks producers and 
importers to bring information allowing to identify the substances in 
terms of properties and usages and specify envisaged levels of production 
and sales. For substances produced or imported by more than 10 
tonnes/year/producer, proponents should present a chemical safety report 
giving the results of toxicity tests and defining appropriate management 
measures apt to guarantee a safe use. In particular this document should 
test the persistent, bioaccumulating and toxic (PBT) characteristics of 
substances and products. In that case information needs are reinforced by 
asking for an exposure assessment and a risk characterisation.  
2. Evaluation is conducted by member states according to guidelines and 
criteria elaborated by the new European Chemical Agency. It is supposed 
to check the quality of testing and data delivered by proponents but also 
to determine which regulatory status will be given to candidate chemicals. 
A specific attention is given to substances and products that should be 
classified as dangerous. On the basis of their evaluation, member states 
present proposals of classification to the European Agency who examines 
them with the help of three committees (risk assessment; socio-economic, 
and member states) before making ultimate proposals to the Commission.  
3. Authorization of chemicals is based on evaluation. Depending on 
dangerousness and quantities involved, a specific authorization is needed. 
Restrictions or complete ban of certain chemicals may result if they cannot 
be used safely and this usage is not essential. A key point is the following: 
proponents should establish that a safe use of theirs chemicals can be 
reach. Dangerous products should be unauthorized for being unsafe, 
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unless it is demonstrated that the benefits for society are higher than 
possible harm to public health and the environment. In that case 
authorisations with restrictions in scope and time can be delivered.  
A first deadline for the registration of chemicals was November 2010 
with the registration of chemicals produced by more than 10000 tonnes/ 
year. 4300 substances have been registered before this deadline. Deadlines 
for other categories are forecast for 2013 and 2018. Priority for examination 
and decision of authorisation has been given to substances of very high 
concern (persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic, mutagen, carcinogen and 
reprotoxic). 
 
An assessment under the light of the PP 
REACH has often been presented, especially by the Commission 
(Rogers, 2003; Fisher, 2008), as an application of the PP in the specific field 
of use and dissemination of chemicals. It is true that article I(3) of the 
REACH regulation presents the new rules as being ‘underpinned by the 
precautionary principle’. At the same time supporters of radical 
conceptions of the PP have expressed their doubts on the precautionary 
content of REACH. This is the case of Hansen et al. (2007).  
These authors begin by expressing their regret that REACH refers to 
the 2000 Communication of the Commission, which is not a right 
expression of the PP to their eyes: a) it adopts a too restrictive 
understanding of scientific uncertainty, as if scientific research and 
improvements of scientific methods will suffice to make them disappear; 
b) it sets the PP in the framework of a standard risk assessment and 
confirm the separation between risk assessment and risk management in 
spite of the pervasive presence of value judgements in risk assessment, 
what is generally called the ‘framing of expertise’; c) it expresses a 
defensive, reactive approach filtering technologies and products but 
insufficiently promotes the search of safer alternative solutions. Regarding 
REACH, they regret that regulating authorities would have to 
demonstrate the existence of a risk and proof indications of its severity 
before they can decide restrictions. This requirement goes on imposing the 
burden of proof on the shoulders of public bodies, which is contradictory 
with the conceptions that the authors have of the PP. They acknowledge 
the shift of responsibility for the collection of data and the performing of 
tests but consider it to be insufficient for a full implementation of the PP. 
Last, they regret that involvement of stakeholders is not systematic at the 
different stages of registration, evaluation and authorisation and the 
opportunity given to the public to comment risk assessment and socio-
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economic analyses is not precisely articulated with the decision-making 
process. 
I suggest a more balanced assessment. Several features fit well to the 
PP’s rationale. First REACH confirms that we do not have to be afraid by 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is not a legitimate motive to postpone safety 
regulation. It is possible to discriminate between chemicals on the basis of 
an evaluation considering a mix of possible impacts and inherent 
characteristics of substances. It is clear that chemicals are exposed to be 
regulated before any harm is observed, confirming the PP’s focus on 
earliness –for new substances. Then it will be necessary to remain alert to 
avoid both false negative and false positive since, as Vlek (2010b) puts it: 
 
“the required level of evidence for precautionary action cannot be fixed but 
should depend on the prior probability or plausibility of harm and the 
seriousness of possible false-positive versus false negative decision 
consequences” (p. 564). 
 
Secondly, like the PP, REACH reaffirms the key role of scientific 
expertise for evaluating riskiness and safety of chemicals. Regulation is 
not expected to break-up with the quest of scientific objectivity but to be 
based on as sound scientific assessment as possible and to submit it to 
comments of stakeholders14. REACH also shows no complacency towards 
uncertainty, since the bulk of this regulation is to oblige business to gather 
and share huge amounts of data relevant for safety. Thirdly, in spite of the 
principle according to which safety has to be established for a substance to 
be authorized, REACH does not fall into the trap of catastrophism since in 
case a chemical product is difficult to substitute and generate important 
benefits to society, a balance of threats and benefits has to be achieved, 
which command the subsequent regulatory treatment. This sounds as a 
partial echo to the core idea of proportionality.  
This being acknowledged, it is fair to say that the main purpose of 
REACH is not to implement the PP. By and large REACH belongs mainly 
to the universe of prevention based on the concept of proof of safety, just 
like the 2002 Regulation on food safety, and on standard tests and 
stabilized science in toxicology and other cousin disciplines. These tests 
are very useful for direct harm on human health but are not well designed 
                                                 
14 To keep-up with the values of rationality and consistency of overall safety policy, it is 
important not to downgrade the contribution of scientific investigation, and fight against 
an increasing tendency to design policy responses on the basis of political tactics in 
response to green NGOs activism, as shown by Nilson (2004) about chemicals in the case 
of Sweden or Godard (2011) about GMOs in the case of France. Socio-political contexts 
and their consequences on decision-making are well analysed by Sunstein, (2005) and 
Lofstedt and al. (2011). 
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to apprehend new types of effects or systemic environmental risks, as 
those affecting biodiversity or human health through chemical synergies 
between various substances traces (Maxim and Spangenberg, 2009). To 
this regard the literature is searching for proxies and alternative 
procedures based either on inherent characteristics of substances, 
amplifying factors of damage or determinants of scale (extent and 
dissemination of demand for products, safely confined versus open use, 
etc.) in order to identify filters, thresholds and screening conditions 
(Klinke et al., 2006) by non arbitrary methods.  
Another source of discrepancy with the PP is the shift to business of 
the operational burden of studying environmental and health impacts of 
chemicals and getting primary data on safety. It is a risky gamble from the 
viewpoint of spread and quality of studies since all short-term incentives 
delivered by the search for profit push business neither to realize all 
investigations and tests that would have been made under a public 
control, nor to transfer all relevant information to public authorities and 
other stakeholders, including consumers and the public. There is anyway 
an issue of credibility: it is not possible to have business firms making or 
controlling safety studies in the name of responsibility and to ask at the 
same time an independent, pluralist and transparent expertise on risks, as 
does the PP. It is certainly useful to involve business in care for risks 
imposed to society but the PP certainly asks for a more diverse source of 
studies and data than those disseminated by firms interested to put their 
products on the market. Secondary assessment and check by public 
agencies can be no substitute for controlling primary sources of 
information and steering the primary impulse of focused scientific 
research. 
A last point concerns the conception of the regulation. The PP puts 
forward a new philosophy of preventive action which conceives the 
precautionary measures as provisional, flexible and paying attention to 
the development of empirical and scientific knowledge, without impairing 
the future by irreversible commitments or irreversible prohibitions; such 
measures should be periodically revised accordingly. REACH does not fit 
well with this fluid approach to precautionary actions15, since its aim is to 
obtain quasi once-for-all classification of substances and, for the 
supposedly most dangerous ones, to decide their definitive eviction. This 
may be explained by the mass of substances to register and evaluate, and 
the necessity to make-up for years of negligence regarding the impact of 
chemicals already disseminated into the environment. Therefore it means 
                                                 
15 It should be noticed that it is the ingredient of the PP that case law of the European 
court of justice tends to disregard (Rogers, 2011). 
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that a specific and distinct role should be maintained for the PP in the field 
of chemicals regulation, in parallel to REACH. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Although the PP has been introduced in the European landscape 
twenty years ago, its content is still fiercely debated. Discrepancies 
between concepts and between concepts and achievements are striking. In 
spite of absence of consensus the EU has adopted a public doctrine of the 
PP in year 2000 which gives precious landmarks of a ‘proportionate’ 
concept. Earliness, proportionality and reversibility of precautionary 
actions thus strongly mark that the PP does not embrace a catastrophist 
viewpoint. Chemicals are on the frontline of the quest for environmental 
and health safety because of their specific features of novelty. As a 
discipline, chemistry is a permanent source of new unknowns, which 
justify a special attention to the risks potentially raised. In Europe the 
REACH regulation shares important components with the PP, such as the 
necessity to take measures without waiting for full scientific certainty and 
to bet on scientific expertise to enlighten policy choices in parallel to 
consultation of stakeholders. At the same time the huge shift of 
responsibility of producing the relevant data on risks to business firms 
that are directly interested in putting their products on the marketplace is 
a source of tension with the PP requirement to set up an independent and 
transparent expertise, far from vested interests. REACH is also much more 
rigid than is expected from precautionary actions under the PP. All this 
suggests that the PP should continue to be trusted a role aside the bigger 
administrative programme of registration and evaluation of chemicals 
driven by REACH. To this regard the PP should be kept as a lighthouse to 
enlighten the developments of green chemistry. 
 
Bibliography 
Belvèze, Henri. “Le principe de précaution et ses implications juridiques 
dans le domaine de la sécurité sanitaire des aliments.” Revue 
scientifique et technique de l’Office international des Épizooties 22, no. 2 
(2003): 387-396. 
Bensaude-Vincent, Bernadette and Jonathan Simon. Chemistry. The Impure 
Science. London: Imperial College Press, 2008. 
European Commission. Communication on the precautionary principle 
COM(2000)1. Brussels, 2 February 2000. 
O. Godard – The precautionary principle and chemical risks  -29- 
 29
European Council. “Resolution of the Council on the Precautionary 
Principle”. In Conclusions of the Presidency, Nice European Council 
Annex III. Nice, 7-9 December 2000. 
European Council. “Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January2002 laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in 
matters of food safety.” Official Journal of the European Communities L 31 
(1.2.2002) (2002): 1-24.  
European Court of Justice. “Judgment of the Court of 5 May 1998. - United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission of the 
European Communities. - Agriculture - Animal health - Emergency 
measures against bovine spongiform encephalopathy - 'Mad cow 
disease'. - Case C-180/96”. European Court Reports 1998 (1998): I-02265. 
European Environment Agency. Late lessons from early warnings: the 
Precautionary Principle – 1896-2000 (Environmental issue report no. 22). 
Copenhagen, 2001. 
Fisher, Elizabeth. “The ‘perfect storm’ of REACH: charting regulatory 
controversy in the age of information, sustainable development, and 
globalization”, Journal of Risk Research 11, no. 4 (2008): 541-563. 
Gardiner, Stephen M. “A core precautionary principle.” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 14, no. 1: 33-60. 
Godard, Olivier, ed. Le principe de précaution dans la conduite des affaires 
humaines. Paris: Éd de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme and INRA-
Editions, 1997. 
Godard, Olivier. « Le principe de précaution comme norme de l’action 
publique, ou la proportionnalité en question. » Revue économique 54, 
no. 6. (2003): 1245-1276. 
Godard, Olivier. « Le principe de précaution et la proportionnalité face à 
l’incertitude scientifique. » In Rapport public 2005 – Responsabilité et 
socialisation du risque, edited by Conseil d’État, 377-392. Paris : La 
Documentation française, 2005. 
Godard, Olivier. “Chapter 4. The precautionary principle and 
catastrophism on tenterhooks: lessons from a constitutional reform in 
France.” In Implementing the Precautionary Principle: Perspectives and 
Prospects, edited by Elizabeth Fisher, Judith Jones and René Von 
Schomberg, 63-87. Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton (MA, US): 
Edward Elgar, 2006. 
Godard, Olivier. “The precautionary principle as a social norm.” In The 
Economics of Sustainable Development, edited by Jean-Michel Lasry, 
Delphine Lautier and Damien Fessler, 98-117. Paris: Economica, 2010. 
O. Godard – The precautionary principle and chemical risks  -30- 
 30
Godard, Olivier. « Le principe de précaution à l’épreuve des OGM. » In 
Regards critiques sur le principe de précaution : le cas des OGM, edited by 
Alain Marciano and Bernard Tourrès, 85-161. Paris : Vrin, (Series ‘Pour 
demain’), 2011.  
Godard, Olivier, Claude Henry, Patrick Lagadec and Erwann Michel-
Kerjan. Traité des nouveaux risques. Précaution, crise, assurance. Paris : 
Gallimard, (Coll. ‘Folio-Actuel’ no. 100), 2002. 
Gollier, Christian. The Economics of Risk and Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT 
Press, 2004. 
Gollier, Christian, Bruno Jullien and Nicolas Treich. “Scientific Progress 
and Irreversibility: An Economic Interpretation of the Precautionary 
Principle.” Journal of Public Economics 75 (2000): 229–253. 
Gonzales-Vaqué Luis, Lothar Ehring, and Cyril Jacquet. “Le principe de 
précaution dans la législation communautaire et nationale relative à la 
protection de la santé.” Revue du Marché Unique Européen 1 (1999): 79-
128. 
Hansen, Steffen F., Lars Carlsen, Joel A. Tickner. “Chemicals regulation and 
precaution: does REACH really incorporate the precautionary 
principle.” Environmental Science and Policy 10 (2007): 395-404.  
Jonas, Hans. The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the 
Technological Age. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
Kast, Robert and André Lapied. Economics and Finance of Risk and of the 
Future. Hoboken (N.J.): John Wiley and sons, 2006. 
Keynes, John M. A Treatise on Probability. London: Mac Millan, 1921, 
reprinted in Collected Writings, VIII. 
Klinke, Andreas, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Andrew Stirling & Patrick 
Van Zwanenberg. “Precautionary Risk Regulation in European 
Governance.” Journal of Risk Research 9, no. 4 (2006): 373-392. 
Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New-York: Kelley, 1921. 
Lofstedt, Ragnar, Frederic Bouder, Jamie Wardman and Sweta 
Chakraborty. “The changing nature of communication and regulation 
of risk in Europe.” Journal of Risk Research 14, no. 14 (2011): 409-429. 
Maxim, Laura and Joachim H. Spangenberg. “Driving forces of chemical 
risks for the European biodiversity.” Ecological Economics 69 (2009) : 
43-54. 
Milton, John P. & Taghi Farvar, eds. The Careless Technology. Ecology and 
International Development. New-York: The Natural History Press, 1972. 
Müller-Herold, Ulrich, Marco Morosini and Olivier Schucht. “Choosing 
Chemicals for Precautionary Regulation: A Filter Series Approach.” 
Environmental Science & Technology 39, no. 3 (2005): 683-691. 
O. Godard – The precautionary principle and chemical risks  -31- 
 31
Nilson, Robert. “Control of chemicals in Sweden: an example of misuse of 
the ‘precautionary principle’.’’ Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety 
57 (2004): 107–117. 
Raffensperger, Carolyn and Joel Tickner, eds. Protecting Public Health and 
the Environment. Implementing the Precautionary Principle. Washington 
DC: Island Press, 1999. 
Rogers, Michael D. “Risk analysis under uncertainty, the Precautionary 
Principle, and the new EU chemicals strategy.” Regulatory Toxicology 
and Pharmacology 37 (2003): 370-381. 
Rogers, Michael D. “Risk management and the record of the precautionary 
principle in EU case law.” Journal of Risk Research 14, no. 4 (2011): 467-
484. 
de Sadeleer, Nicolas. Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal 
Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Savage, Leonard J. The foundation of statistics. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, 1954. Revised edition: New-York: Dover Publ., 1972.  
Schummer, Joachim. “Ethics of Chemical Synthesis.” HYLE – International 
Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry 7, no. 2 (2001): 103-124.  
Stokes, Elen. “The EC courts’ contribution to refining the parameters of 
precaution.” Journal of Risk Research 11, no. 4 (2008): 491-507. 
Sunstein, Cass. Laws of Fear – Beyond the Precautionary Principle. Cambridge 
(UK): Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Vlek, Charles. “Judicious management of uncertain risks: I. Developments 
and criticisms of risk analysis and precautionary reasoning.” Journal of 
Risk Research 13, no. 4 (2010a): 517-543. 
Vlek, Charles. “Judicious management of uncertain risks: II. Simple rules 
and more intricate models for precautionary decision-making.” Journal 
of Risk Research 13, no. 4 (2010b): 545-569. 
 
